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1. Introduction 
  We conducted a laboratory experiment designed to generate consumer WTP for attributes 
of California Cabernet Sauvignon under different information conditions. Participants received 
new information about four Cabernet Sauvignons produced in California in each round of the 
experiment. After receiving each piece of information, each participant submitted a bid for each 
of the four wines. The research also generated a rich dataset of participant characteristics based 
on a survey administered during the experimental session. The results allow a novel examination 
of consumer valuation of objective label attributes and sensory attributes. 
  In this experiment, participants simultaneously received identical, controlled information 
about four wines. After each release of new information, participants submitted bids for each 
wine in an experimental auction.  The experimental auction created incentives for participants to 
report WTP truthfully.  Participants could do no better than to bid their true maximum WTP for a 
good.  The experiment permitted unbiased estimation of the systematic effects that consumer 
characteristics have on valuation of wine and wine attributes.   
A sample of 236 participants bid on four wines in nine rounds, resulting in over 8,000 
bids on wine attributes.  Participants also submitted 944 hedonic, “liking” ratings.  The analysis 
of the laboratory experiment provides measures of consumer valuation of wine attributes, and 
evidence of the consumer characteristics that contribute systematically to valuation of wine 
attributes. 
  The design of the experiment permitted consistent measurement of consumer WTP for 
wine attributes, an examination of consumer valuation of the sensory attributes of Cabernet 
Sauvignon, and study of the effect of participant characteristics on wine attribute valuation.  To 	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that end, the experiment released information about the wines to participants and elicited bids 
from participants sequentially, allowing a clear identification of changes in WTP in response to 
release of information. The experiment design permits analysis of causal relationships among 
wine attributes, consumer characteristics, and WTP for wine attributes. 
	 ﾠ
2. Steps in the Laboratory Procedure 
  The laboratory research proceeded in two steps.  In the first step, a sensory panel trained 
to differentiate sensory attributes analyzed a set of 20 commercially available Cabernet 
Sauvignons.  The data generated in the sensory analysis helped in the selection of a sub-group of 
wines that had different sensory profiles, were from different appellations, received a range of 
expert ratings, and were available at a range of prices at retail. The laboratory valuation 
experiment was the second step of the research process.  Participants received information on the 
subset of wines selected for the consumer research in a sequential process, which is described in 
detail below.  
  The next section reports results from the sensory analysis of the set of 20 California 
Cabernet Sauvignons and the criteria used to select the subset of wines for the consumer 
research, and then presents the results of the analysis of consumer WTP for wine attributes. 
 
3. Conduct of the Consumer Valuation Experiment 
  Across 12 sessions from April 1, 2009 to July 9, 2009, 236 people participated in the 
valuation experiment.  The consumer panel received information about attributes of the wines 
and submitted bids for the wines, representing their WTP.  Participants understood that the 
decisions they made in the research could lead to an actual wine purchase.  The Becker-DeGroot-	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Marschak (BDM) Mechanism (Becker et al., 1964) provided participants with the incentive to 
consider their bids carefully. 
  Authors have discussed at length the incentive problems created in hypothetical choice 
scenarios.  A number of papers have established the occurrence of hypothetical bias.  Cummings 
and Taylor (1999), List (2001), and Lusk (2003) study the effects of hypothetical bias on 
valuation.  Therefore, participants needed a reason to weigh their valuation decision carefully.  
Researchers have used experimental auctions for this purpose for nearly two decades.   
Therefore, an experimental auction using the BDM elicited WTP measures from participants. 
 
3.1. Laboratory Experiment Procedure  
  Each participant received a 10-page packet when they signed in, which contained a set of 
instructions explaining the research.
1  For the instructions and demonstration of the computer 
interface, participants sat as a group in a central room; the sensory booths—accessed through a 
door in the central room—formed a “U” around the back and two side walls of the central room.  
The researcher read the instructions aloud in front of the group.  The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
mechanism (1964)—used to incentivize truthful reporting of valuation—was explained and 
motivated to participants with examples, hypothetical auctions, and a binding candy bar auction.  
Participants were encouraged to ask questions about the procedure, and the researcher presented 
hypothetical outcomes and asked questions to gauge understanding. 
  Before the binding auction rounds, subjects filled out a demographic questionnaire. 
Participants then proceeded to their booth for the binding auction. The experiment comprised 
nine rounds.  In each round, participants received information on four wines.  The group of 
wines was constant in rounds 1-4. In rounds 5-9, participants received the same categories of 
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information on a second group of four wines.  The two groups of wines were identical, but 
participants received different pieces of information with each group.  For instance, if a 
participant saw the Wine Spectator score for a wine in round 3, they saw the Wine Advocate 
score for that wine in round 7.  The placement of the wines on-screen and the presentation of 
alternate appellations and expert ratings were randomized to prevent order and group effects on 
bids. 
  The categories of information revealed to participants were nearly identical for the group 
in round 1-4 as for the group in round 5-9, the only difference being that participants received a 
20-ml sample of each of the wines in Round 9.  Table 1 reveals the structure of the auction—the 
timing of the release of pieces of information revealed about each wine.  Once a round revealed a 
piece of information, it continued to be available in subsequent rounds.  Thus, when Round 3 
reported expert rating in Round 3, participants were also able to see the information from rounds 
1 and 2 on screen.  The only exception to this was the sensory information round, in which 
participants received 20 mL samples of each wine.  In this round, a random ID number between 
000 and 999 identified each wine on screen, and matched an ID sticker on each wineglass.   
 
3.2. Consumer Bidding and Release of Information on the Wines 
  To obtain an initial baseline estimate of participant valuation, in Round 1 and Round 5 
(the first round of the second group of wines), participants saw that each of the wines was a 
Cabernet Sauvignon produced within the state of California.
2  They then submitted a bid for each 
wine.  In Round 2 and Round 6, participants received information on the appellation of origin of 
each wine.  After receiving appellation information, participants submitted bids for each wine.  
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In Round 3 and Round 7, participants received information on the expert rating given to each 
wine.
3  They then submitted bids based on the cumulative information on each wine.  In Rounds 
4 and 8, participants submitted bids after learning the name of the winery that produced each 
wine.  After round 8, participants received samples of the four wines presented in rounds 5 
through 8.   
  Rounds 9a and 9b were specific to the second group of wines.  Upon reaching round 9, 
each participant received the wine samples. After smelling and tasting each wine sample, 
participants first used the 50-100 point scales to rate each wine in round 9a.  Once they had 
finished rating the wines, they moved on to round 9b.  In round 9b, participants bid on each of 
the wines in the second group one last time.  While considering their bids, participants had all of 
the information received in rounds 5 through 8, as well as the rating they themselves had given 
the wines in round 9a. 
  After completing round 9b, participants returned to the central instruction room and 
completed a “wine knowledge questionnaire.”  The knowledge questionnaire was left as the last 
step of the research to avoid priming people of different knowledge levels to actively consider 
their knowledge or lack of knowledge about wines while they bid.
4   
  At the end of the auction, one of the nine valuation rounds was chosen at random by a 
computer to be the binding round for each participant, and one of the four wines in that round 
was chosen at random to be the binding wine.  The participant’s bid for that wine in that round 
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rating was drawn from one of those two sources.   
4 Experiments have shown that inducing people to think about different aspects of themselves can affect their 
behavior.  Perhaps the most illustrative example of this is research randomly assigning a group of female, Asian-
American university students to one of two groups and prompted to consider their gender or their ethnicity in an 
essay about multi-gender housing or cultural issues experienced growing up.  Both groups then took a math test.  
Those prompted to consider their ethnicity scored significantly higher than participants prompted to consider their 
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was then compared to a computer-generated random price.  Each round, wine, and experiment 
price was unique for every participant.  If the participant’s bid was higher than the random price, 
the participant purchased a coupon for the wine for the random price.  If their bid was lower than 
the random price, they did not purchase a coupon for a bottle of wine.  Finally, a researcher 
presented the results of each participant’s bidding, randomly drawn round, randomly drawn 
wine, and randomly drawn price to each participant individually. With nine rounds of bidding (1-
8, 9b), and bids for four wines per round, the laboratory experiment generated 8496 bids and 944 
hedonic “liking” scores.  Twenty-one participants were removed from the sample due to 
evidence that they did not understand the experiment, leaving 215 participants.  All subsequent 
analyses refer to the reduced consumer sample of 7,740 bids and 860 liking scores. 
  The computer drew the experiment prices from a normal distribution centered slightly 
below the purchase price of each wine. Thirty-two of the 236 participants (or 14 percent) 
purchased a bottle of wine.  Participants purchased all of the wines except for the Mondavi ($45 
at retail), though the majority of purchases were of the Mirassou ($10 retail).   
 
4. Consumer Valuation of Attributes in an Auction Setting 
  Each participant received new information about each bottle of wine in each round and 
then submitted a bid for each wine. This bid, bijt, is based on the attributes, zj, of a wine j, as well 
as the characteristics of the participant i, xi.  Participants received information about the wines 
and submitted bids for those wines sequentially. Recall that participants had a subset of the 
information on each wine in any round.  Therefore, the analysis needs to account for the 
information available to the participant at a particular point in time.  Let the information 
available to the participant when they submit a bid in a particular round be the information set, S, 	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at time t. Equation 6.1 represents the relationship between the bid and the attributes of the wine 
and the consumer’s characteristics: 
(1)         =  (  ,  |  ). 
  The participants received the wines according to a Latin Square design. Latin Square 
designs eliminate order effects by randomizing the presentation order (in a balanced manner). A 
Latin Square design ensures that the wines do not systematically appear in any position.  For 
example, it guarantees that the Beringer wine appears in each position on the computer screen as 
many times as the other wines.
5   
  Guidelines for permissible labeling practices and multiple expert rating sources increased 
variation of appellation and expert rating.  Table 2 lists the objective information that was 
presented for each wine.  As mentioned previously, participants received identical information 
about each wine in the baseline round.  If Wine 1 in table 2 was labeled with the Knights Valley 
appellation (a Sonoma County sub-AVA) in round 2, it was labeled Sonoma County in round 6 
(or Knights Valley in round 6 and Sonoma County in round 2). If participants learned that Wine 3 
received an expert rating of 88 in round 3(7), they would see a wine with a rating of 93 in round 
7(3).  Participants did not know that the wines presented in rounds 1-4 were the same as those 
presented in round 5-9. 
 
5. Summary Statistics of Data Generated in the Laboratory Experiment 
  The laboratory experiment generated data on consumer WTP for wine attributes. It also 
generated a rich set of data on consumer characteristics, including income, demographic 
information (age, education level, and gender), wine market experience (such as number of 
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bottles purchased per month, average price spent per bottle, whether the participant has read 
wine literature), and wine knowledge, which was measured by a wine quiz.  These data were 
then used to analyze consumer WTP for wine attributes, and to look at the effect of different 
participant characteristics on valuation of wine attributes.  
 
5.1. Summary Data on the Demographic Variables 
  Both the laboratory and field participants submitted similar demographic, wine market-
experience, and wine knowledge data. The appendix to this chapter contains both the wine 
experience and demographic questionnaire and the wine knowledge questionnaire.  This section 
compares summary data from both samples. 
  Table 3 displays wine experience data and demographic data. Participants in the field and 
laboratory experiment participated in the research in Davis, but it is likely that some participants 
lived elsewhere. However, census data on Davis provide the best comparison.  
  Fifty-six percent of the sample is female, which is three percent higher than the general 
population in Davis.  The mean age of participants in the survey is just under 36 years of age, 
almost exactly four years under the mean age of the legal wine-buying population in Davis.  The 
mean household income of laboratory participants is $64,500, which is $18,000 under the mean 
income in Davis.  Participants in the laboratory experiment were better educated than the 
population of Davis 25 years of age and above, with mean years of education greater than 16. On 
average, participants correctly answered 63 percent of the questions on the knowledge quiz.   
  Participants in the laboratory research said they purchased an average of 4.5 bottles of 
wine per month, or a little over one bottle per week.  Participants reported purchasing a wide 
range, from one bottle a month on average, to 18 bottles per month.  Laboratory experiment 	 ﾠ 10	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participants report spending an average of $11.59 per bottle and that they have been purchasing 
wine for an average of 11 years.  The mean number of wineries visited per year was 3.77.  Over 
a quarter of participants stated that they had received some type of instruction on wine.  Nearly 
fifty percent read wine literature at the time of the study or had in the past (books or magazines 
on wine). 
 
5.2. Summary Data on Willingness to Pay Bids 
  Mean bids per round and changes in bid from one round to another are listed in Table 4.  
The mean bid per bottle in the laboratory experiment across all rounds was $7.74.  The mean bid 
is low compared to the mean shelf price of the four wines used in the experiment ($25) and the 
mean shelf price of California Cabernet Sauvignon wines at our partner supermarket ($12.70). 
Several reasons account for the lower bids.  A significant amount of accumulated evidence 
suggests that bids for market products tend to be low in an experimental setting. In experiments, 
since products are presented exogenously to participants, participants are unable to choose their 
preferred variant.  Additionally, only in rounds 4, 8, and 9 did participants have full label 
information on the wines.  On average bids increased every time participants received additional 
objective label information.   
  The mean bid in the baseline information rounds, rounds 1 and 5, was $6.59, and was not 
statistically different between rounds 1 and 5. Average bids increased in each subsequent round 
(in rounds 1-4 and 5-8) as objective information was revealed, until the tasting prior to round 9.   
The most interesting result from the examination of mean bids is the change in mean bid 
from the winery name round (8) to the full information round (9b).  The only change in 
information available to participants from round (8) to (9b) was that participants received a 	 ﾠ 11	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sample of each of the wines they were evaluating.  As reported in table 4, mean bids decreased 
by $0.73 per bottle when participants received samples of each of the wines.  The opportunity to 
taste the wine decreased participants’ estimates of the utility they derived from the purchase of a 
bottle of that wine.  Other factors may have influenced participants’ enjoyment of the wine, 
though, including the setting (a laboratory booth) or the absence of food, for example.  
 
6. Analysis and Interpretation of Consumer Valuation of Wine Attributes 
  The appropriate statistical analysis of wine bids depends on the relationship between the 
wines’ attributes.  For example, consumers bid on a wine based on revelation of the wines’ 
appellations in one round; in the next round, they received information about experts’ ratings of 
the wines and bid again.  If the attributes interact, this relationship needs to be controlled for 
when estimating WTP.  That is, if a Sonoma County Cabernet Sauvignon with a 90-point Wine 
Spectator rating is valued differently from a Napa Valley Cabernet Sauvignon with a 90-point 
Wine Spectator rating, both appellation and expert rating variables need to be included in the 
regression. On the other hand, if appellation and expert rating were completely substitutable 
pieces of information in expected utility, then bids in the expert rating round would refine the 
bids based on appellation, which would permit the use of the price levels rather than changes in 
price.  The analysis examines these different scenarios in the next sections.   
 
6.1. Consumer Valuation in Baseline Information Rounds 
	 ﾠ The first round of the each segment of the bidding process (rounds 1 and 5) gave 
participants general, baseline information about the four wines and elicited WTP measures from 
the participants.  Specifically, participants learned only that each of the wines was a Cabernet 	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Sauvignon made from grapes grown in California.  The obvious strategy of bidders given the 
lack of differentiating information was to bid the same amount for each wine.   
  The experiment presented each wine in every ordered position on the screen an equal 
number of times. In the design of the research, the wines were designated wine 1 (Beringer), 2 
(Mirassou), 3 (Mondavi), and 4 (Beaulieu).  A Latin Square design randomized the order of 
presentation to the participants.  For example, one participant received the wines in order 4132, 
another in 2431, and a third in 1423.   
  The purpose of the first round was to elicit a baseline level of WTP.  It also provided a 
measure of the participants’ comprehension of the experiment procedure. The baseline rounds 
provided evidence on bidding consistency that screened the data used for the analysis. As 
mentioned above, inconsistent baseline bidding also led to data from 21 participants being 
dropped from further analysis. 
 
6.1.1. Consumer Valuation of Baseline Information 
  The first step in the analysis was to verify that there were no significant differences in 
bids for the wines in the baseline information scenario. To do this, the bid submitted in the 
baseline scenario was regressed on dummy variables for each of the four wines.  Wine 1 is the 
omitted category, or intercept, and has an estimated value of $6.63.  There is no statistical 
significance between any of the wines in the baseline information category. Table 5 reports the 
results of the regression with the outliers removed. 
 
6.1.2. Consumer Valuation of Baseline Information with Consumer Characteristics 	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  The estimated intercept reported in column 1 of table 5 included the mean effect of all 
participant characteristics that influence wine valuation.  Introducing consumer characteristics 
with no interaction between characteristics and attributes affects only the intercept. All of the 
marginal differences between the wines remain constant.  Column 2 in table 5 reports the 
estimated coefficients from the regression of bids on dummy variables for the wines and all 
consumer characteristics, using robust standard errors clustered on participants.  
  The two statistically significant parameter estimates in regression 2 are the self-reported 
mean price paid per bottle of wine, and whether the participant is a wine club member.  The 
parameter estimate of price per bottle—the mean price the participant reported spending on a 
bottle of wine—is 0.25, which implies that for every additional dollar that participants reported 
spending per bottle of wine, baseline bids for the wines in the experiment increased by $0.25.  
The second significant variable, wine club membership, had a coefficient estimate of 1.59, 
indicating that wine club members bid $1.59 more for the bottles of wine than non-wine club 
members did.  The significant positive parameter estimates may indicate that the participants 
who are wine club members and who spend more on wine in general value wine more than their 
counterparts, or it could be that they estimated that more expensive wines were used for the 
research. 
  A few points should be made here. The consumer characteristics that are significant in 
the baseline rounds may not be significant in later rounds.  In fact, the, the factors influencing the 
bids in later rounds might be very different from those influencing the undifferentiated baseline 
scenario bids. Discussion of the interaction of wine attributes and consumer characteristics 
occurs in a later section.   
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6.2. Consumer Valuation in Appellation Information Rounds 
  In the Appellation rounds, participants received information on the specific appellation of 
each wine.  For the wines used in this research, those appellations were California, Knights 
Valley (of Sonoma County), Napa Valley, Oakville (of Napa Valley), and Sonoma County. Note 
that though this would have been known by some participants, participants were not told that 
Knights Valley and Oakville was a sub-appellation within Sonoma and Napa counties. The 
experiment used a nested appellation structure to look at consumer valuation of appellation and 
consumer characteristics. 
 
6.2.1. Consumer Valuation of Appellation 
  Table 6, column 1 shows the analysis of the valuation of Cabernet Sauvignon 
appellations.  The equation estimated is: 
(2) ﾠ     =    +       ℎ   ﾠ       +        ﾠ       +            +          ﾠ       +
  .   
The categorical variable California was omitted to prevent collinearity. The regression was 
estimated with robust standard errors clustered on participants and random effects.
6  Bids for the 
appellations included in the model are all positive, and all coefficients on appellations are 
statistically significant at normal levels.  The coefficient on Knights Valley is 0.65, and Napa 
Valley is 2.19.  Oakville’s estimated coefficient is 1.63, and the coefficient on Sonoma County is 
1.92.  All of these coefficients represent the premium participants are willing to pay compared to 
the California appellation with no additional information except for grape type. 
  It is unsurprising that the estimated WTP is lowest for wines labeled California.  
According to the estimates, Napa Valley is preferred (or provides the highest expected utility), 
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closely followed by Sonoma County, then by Oakville and, finally, Knights Valley. Oakville, a 
sub-appellation of Napa Valley, and Knights Valley, a Sonoma County appellation, tend to sell at 
higher prices in the market place than the larger appellation.
7     
  There are two immediate explanations for the data, one of which is testable, and one of 
which is not. Participants on average may not have been familiar with Oakville or Knights 
Valley.  Using wine experience variables and scores on the knowledge quiz, effects of wine 
experience and knowledge on valuation can be examined by interacting wine experience 
variables with each individual appellation. The second hypothesis is not testable. Participants 
may have assumed that the wines used in the experiments represent wines sold at a relatively 
uniform price in the market, in which case, they would expect that these wines would represent 
below-average quality for the two higher-priced appellations.   The next section discusses results 
of the analysis incorporating consumer characteristics into the regression of bids on appellations.   
 
6.2.2. Consumer Valuation of Appellation and Consumer Characteristics 
  Column 2 in table 6 presents the estimated coefficients from regression 2—the regression 
of bids on appellations and consumer characteristics.  The coefficients on the appellation 
variables scarcely change from regression 1 to regression 2.  The estimated coefficient for 
Sonoma County decreases from 1.92 to 1.88, but this is the largest change (and is not statistically 
significant).  The statistically significant consumer characteristics are the same characteristics 
that were significant in the analysis of baseline bids: Price per Bottle and Wine Club Member.  
The coefficient on Price per Bottle is larger in the appellation round than in the baseline round—
0.35 versus 0.25.  The interpretation of the coefficient is that for each additional dollar a 
participant reported spending on average on a bottle of wine, bids were $0.35 higher.  For 
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instance, a participant who reported a Price per Bottle of $20 would bid $3.50 more per wine in 
the appellation rounds of the experiment than a participant who reported a Price per Bottle of 
$10.  Wine Club Member, a categorical variable, increased the bid level by $1.53.  In this 
specification, both consumer characteristics affect the general level of the bids, and not the 
differences in WTP between appellation attributes. 
 
6.3. Consumer Valuation in Expert Rating Information Rounds 
  Expert rating is generally maintained to be a very important source of information for 
consumers when making their wine choices.  Repeated studies have shown that additional expert 
rating points are highly valued by consumers (see, for instance, Landon and Smith (1998) or 
Costanigro et al. (2007)).  There are a multitude of wine rating organizations and publications.  
Participants in the laboratory experiment received ratings from Robert Parker’s Wine Advocate 
and the Wine Spectator in rounds 3 and 7. 
 
6.3.1. Consumer Valuation of Expert Rating 
  Participants received information on the ratings awarded to wines by the Wine Advocate 
(Robert Parker) and the Wine Spectator in the third and seventh rounds.  Ratings for the wines 
used in the experiments ranged from 77 to 93, and the Wine Advocate did not review the 
Beaulieu or the Mirassou.  Dummy variables for each rating were created: one for those wines 
not reviewed (NR), 77, 85, 88, and 93.   
  The coefficients estimated in this analysis are mostly intuitive.  Higher ratings ought to 
yield higher bids, which was the case.  It was unclear, however, how participants would interpret 
wines that were not reviewed by either wine rating publication.  To analyze the data, bids in 	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ
rounds 3 and round 7 are regressed on the dummy variables for appellations, to control for the 
information participants already had, and the different expert ratings, with the 77-point rating 
being the omitted category.  California is, again, the omitted appellation category. The estimated 
specification is 
(3) 
       =    +       ℎ   ﾠ       +        ﾠ       +            +          ﾠ       +
       ﾠ         +    85 ﾠ       +    88 ﾠ       +    93 ﾠ       +    
  The estimated coefficients are ordered as expected.  The estimate of the intercept, which 
contains both the California appellation and the omitted 77-point category, was $5.65. The 
parameters on Napa Valley, Oakville, and Sonoma County continue to be statistically significant.  
Knights Valley no longer is estimated to have a significant effect on WTP, however.  Wines not 
reviewed had an estimated coefficient of a $0.54 premium over the 77-point wine.  A rating of 
85 points led to bids $1.96 higher than the omitted 77-point category.  The 88-point wines had an 
estimated coefficient of $2.29.  Finally, participants were willing to pay $5.05 for a rating of 93 
points.  
 
6.3.2. Consumer Valuation of Expert Rating and Consumer Characteristics 
  Table 7 displays results from the analysis of bids submitted with information on 
appellation and expert rating regressed on wine attributes (the specification in column 1), and 
bids regressed on wine attributes and consumer characteristics (column 2).     
  The linear addition of consumer characteristics again does not change the estimates of the 
attribute coefficients significantly, and all estimated attribute coefficients remain statistically 
significant.  The intercept does decrease notably, reflecting the introduction of continuous (non-	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dummy) variables such as wine knowledge quiz score, average price paid per bottle, age, and 
household income, which explain much of the variation previously captured by the intercept.  
After the introduction of the continuous variables, the intercept reflects the estimated bid with 
these variables measured at zero, so the previous estimated intercept has been decomposed into 
the contributions of different consumer characteristics. 
  With consumer characteristics added linearly to the estimation equation, the estimated 
coefficients on the wine attributes change little.  As in the regressions in previous rounds, only 
two participant characteristics have a statistically significant affect on WTP: the mean price paid 
per bottle, and wine club membership.  The estimated coefficient for Price per Bottle is 0.40; for 
every additional dollar participants reported spending per bottle of wine on average, their bids 
increased by $0.40.  Secondly, wine club membership increased bids by $1.55.  A categorical 
variable, the estimate suggests that members of wine clubs bid $1.55 more on average across all 
four wines than non-members.  The consumer characteristics Price per Bottle and Wine Club 
Member are consistent predictors of higher bids across rounds.  
 
6.4. Consumer Valuation in Winery Name Information Rounds 
  The next piece of information that participants received was winery name.  Column 1 of 
table 8 reports the results of the regression of bids on appellations, expert ratings, and winery 
names.  For the analysis, Beaulieu Vineyards was the omitted winery name variable. California 
and 77 Points continued to be omitted categories. The regression of bids on appellations, expert 
ratings, and winery names yielded a positive, statistically significant estimate of the intercept of 
$6.63.  Two appellations still significantly explain bids. The coefficient estimate for Napa Valley 
adds $0.94 to the intercept. Oakville has an estimated coefficient of $1.46.  Three expert rating 	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
scores are statistically significant.  An 85-point rating increased bids by $1.53, while 88-points 
had an estimated coefficient of $2.27.  A 93-point rating increased bids by $4.66.  The only 
winery name that affects bids is Mirassou.  The estimated coefficient on Mirassou is -$0.76.   
  Column 2 of table 8 reports the results of the regression of WTP on appellations, expert 
ratings, winery names, and participant characteristics. Estimated coefficients of the wine 
attributes do not change with the addition of participant characteristics.  The only statistically 
significant participant characteristic in this specification is the price paid per bottle, with an 
estimated coefficient of 0.43. 
    
6.5. Consumer Valuation in Sensory Information Rounds 
  After the release of information on a wine’s appellation, expert rating, and the winery that 
produced it, participants in this research received a sample of each wine to smell and taste.  
Following sensory examination of the sample, consumers submitted bids for the wines again.  
Table 4 showed that mean bids across all wines decreased with access to samples of each wine 
by an average of $0.73.  Table 9 lists the results of two regressions of bid on each wine that 
participants sampled.  All regressions feature a combination of dummy variables for the different 
wines and the quality rating, or Hedonic Rating, each participant assigned to each wine.   
  Column 1 in Table 9 contains the estimated coefficients of a regression of bid on the 
appellation, expert rating, and Hedonic Rating variables.  Because of the smaller number of 
observations in the sensory round—half as many as the other rounds—including appellation, 
expert rating, and winery name creates perfect collinearity amongst regressors, winery name is 
left out of the regression.  The sensory liking variable, Hedonic Rating, ranges from 50 to 100 
points. In regression 1, none of the appellation variables has a statistically significant parameter 	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
estimate.  However, both Expert Rating 88 and Expert Rating 93 have positive and statistically 
significant parameters.  The estimated parameter on Hedonic Rating is 0.243, or for each 
additional point a participant scored a wine, their WTP increased by nearly $0.25.  
  It is interesting to note that even with information about the taste and smell of the wines, 
the two highest expert ratings retained statistical significance.  There are again multiple 
interpretations of the estimates.  Participants may value having a highly rated wine beyond the 
enjoyment they receive from consuming it. A wine with a high expert rating may be more 
valuable as a gift or as a wine brought to a dinner party than a non-highly rated wine with the 
same sensory attributes.  Alternatively, it may be that participants did not completely adjust their 
bids from the previous round.  Additionally, a participant may have interpreted the expert rating 
as adding information about the likely enjoyment of the wine in a more natural setting to 
information gathered in the lab. 
  The variable, Hedonic Rating, reported in columns 1 and 2 in Table 9 is the quality rating 
that each participant awarded each of the wines, and reflects each participant’s enjoyment of the 
wine.  There was a significant amount of heterogeneity in wine preferences—a segment of the 
participants in the experiment preferred each wine.  Including the Hedonic Rating variable in the 
regression should control for participants’ heterogeneous preferences.     
  When controlling for the effect of heterogeneous consumer preferences, the coefficients 
on the wine attribute variables capture the effect of the sensory sample on participants’ bids for 
wines enjoyed equally. In this case, the coefficient on each wine is the effect of the objective 
information on changes in bids for identically scored wines.  The parameter estimate of ER88 
was 1.72, and the estimated parameter ER93 was 1.84.  As mentioned above, both parameters 
were statistically significant.  If Hedonic Rating captured all of a consumer’s value for a wine, 	 ﾠ 21	 ﾠ
none of the other wine attributes should have explanatory power as regressors.  The significance 
of ER88 and ER93 shows that other wine attributes remain relevant in wine valuation.  Even with 
sensory information about the contents of the bottle, consumers value objective information.  
  Regression 2 in table 9 introduces participant characteristics into the regression 
specification from regression 1 in 9.  Very few parameters are statistically significant here.  
Three participant characteristics positively affect WTP: mean price spent per bottle, wine club 
membership, and education (years of schooling).  The first two, price per bottle and wine club 
member had significant parameter estimates in the analysis of bids in earlier rounds too.  In the 
second specification, price spent per bottle increases bids by $0.32.  Wine club members submit 
bids that are $1.47 higher on average.  Education, with an estimated coefficient of 0.36, implies 
that with an additional year of school, a participant bids $0.36 more in the sensory round. 
 
7. Conclusions 
  The results of the laboratory experiment confirm many of the previously held notions 
about valuation of wine by consumers.  Participants value Cabernet Sauvignons from Napa 
Valley and Sonoma County and their sub-appellations more than wines labeled with the 
California appellation.  Bids for wines rated by experts such as the Wine Advocate (Robert 
Parker) or Wine Spectator increased as the experts’ ratings increased.   
  Including participant characteristics in the models revealed interesting and systematic 
results.  Participants’ bids for wines in the baseline rounds did not differ in a statistically 
significant manner, and the only statistically significant parameters were how much the 
participant typically spent per bottle of wine and whether the participant was a member of a wine 
club.  The estimated coefficients on both were positive and highly significant. There seem to be 	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consistent behavioral differences captured by participant characteristics that influence the 
marginal valuations of wine attributes.  The most consistent of these are mean price paid per 
bottle and wine club membership.   
  In the laboratory experiment analysis, mean price paid per bottle and wine club 
membership interact with the wine attributes to affect WTP.  Statistically significant differences 
in the estimated coefficients of both price paid per bottle and wine club membership were found 
in the appellation, expert rating, and sensory information rounds.  Recall that these are 
differences in the marginal valuations of wine attributes, not differences in the entire bottle.  
These differences stem from predictable consumer characteristics.  Participants who pay higher 
mean price per bottle of wine and those belonging to wine clubs respond more to differentiating 
information than do those participants who typically spend a lower price and those not belonging 
to wine clubs, demonstrating that even without supply-side influences, there are reasons that 
price differences exist in the market for different attributes.   
  In the absence of other quality signals, appellation is a highly valued and important 
component of consumer valuation.  However, as this research demonstrated, valuation of 
appellation and other wine attributes differs across segments of the consumer population.  
Importantly, this implies that own- and cross-price elasticities of demand will differ across 
segments of the population, and are not consistent with findings based on a typical hedonic price 
regression on market data. 
  Further, the sensory round showed significant heterogeneity in preferences amongst 
participants.  At least 15 percent of participants rated each wine as the best wine from a sensory 
standpoint.  Overall, the ranking of wines by experts reflected the average ranking of wines by 
participants, but many participants exhibited preferences significantly different from those of the 	 ﾠ 23	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expert raters.  Importantly, this research has demonstrated that significant heterogeneity in 
marginal preferences exists for objective wine attributes, and that there is a significant amount of 
heterogeneity in consumer preferences for sensory wine attributes.   
   	 ﾠ 24	 ﾠ
Table 1: Information Categories and Timing of Release 
Information Category  Group 1  Group 2 
Baseline Information 
 
Round 1: Bid  Round 5: Bid 
Appellation 
 
Round 2: Bid  Round 6: Bid 
Expert Rating 
 
Round 3: Bid  Round 7: Bid 
Winery Name 
 
Round 4: Bid  Round 8: Bid 
Sample (taste/smell) 
 
  Round 9a: Liking Score  
 
Round 9b: Bid 
 
Source: Design of laboratory experiment. 
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Table 2: Descriptive information on the wines used in the laboratory experiment 







R. Parker: NA 
 
Wine Spec: 77 
$20  127,000 





R. Parker: 88 
 
Wine Spec: 88 
$25  83,500 
Mirassou  California  R. Parker: NA 
 
Wine Spec: 85 
 







R. Parker: 88 
 
Wine Spec: 93 
$45  10,637 
Source: Design of laboratory experiment. 
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Table 3: Wine Knowledge and Experience and Demographic Data 
   Mean  Standard 
Error 
Minimum  Maximum 
Quiz (%) 
 
0.63  0.17  0.18  1.00 
Bottles/Month 
 
4.84  0.32  0  25 
Price/Bottle 
 
11.59  0.29  7.5  25 
Years Buying Wine 
 
11.04  0.66  2.5  35 
Wineries Visited per 
Year 
 
3.77  0.27  0  20 
Wine Club Member 
(%) 
 








0.77  0.03  0  1 
Class on Wine 
(%) 
 
0.27  0.03  0  1 
Keep Wine Journal 
(%) 
 
0.14  0.03  0  1 
Sensory Trained (%) 
 
0.21  0.03  0  1 
Female (%) 
 
0.56  0.03  0  1 
Age 
 




65.35  3.72  15  200+ 
Education 
 
16.58  0.10  12  18 
Source: Participant Questionnaire, Laboratory Experiment 
Notes: 215 observations 
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Table 4: Mean Bids Per Round 
Round  Mean 
(Std. Error) 
Change  Percentage 
Change 
All (Rounds 1-8, 9b)  7.74 
(0.36) 
 
   
Baseline (Round 1 and 5)  6.59 
(0.28) 
 
   
Appellation (Round 2 and 6)  7.48 
(0.33) 
 
+0.89  +13.51% 
Expert Rating (Round 3 and 7)  8.17 
(0.39) 
 
+0.69  +9.22% 
Winery Name (Round 4 and 8)  8.62 
(0.40) 
 
+0.45  +5.51% 
Taste/Smell (Round 9b)  7.89 
(0.40) 
 
-0.73  -8.47% 
Price of CA Cab. Sauv. sold at 
Nugget Market, weighted by 
bottles sold. 
12.70     




   
Source: Experiment data generated in rounds 1-8 and 9b. 
Notes: There are 1756 observations for each category of information and 7912 observations for 
the calculations in “All Rounds”. 
Data provided in the table are means and, in parentheses, standard deviations. 
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Baseline: Wine Attributes 
 
(1) 






   6.63
** 




























  0.41 
(1.76) 
Bottles Purchased per 
Month 
 
  0.049 
(0.068) 
Price Paid per Bottle 
 
 
   0.25
** 
(0.066) 
Years Buying Wine 
 
 
  0.054 
(0.052) 
Wineries Visited per 
Year 
 
  -0.016 
(0.078) 
Wine Club Member 
 
 
     1.58
** 
(0.77) 
Prefer Red Wines 
 
 





  0.63 
(0.59) 
Read Wine Literature 
 
 
  0.22 
(0.57) 	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ
Table 5 Continued     
  Baseline: Wine Attributes 
 
(1) 
Baseline: Attributes with 
Consumer Characteristics 
(2) 
Keep Wine Journal 
 





























3431.5  3455.8 
Log-Likelihood Score 
 
-1693.4  -1653.5 
Notes: Significance: (**) = p ≤ 0.05; (*) = p ≤ 0.10 with a two-tailed test. 
Reported values are coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. 
Number of observations = 1756 observations 
Source: Laboratory experiment bids rounds 1 and 4.   	 ﾠ 30	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Table 6: Comparison of Regressions of Bids in Rounds 2 and 6 on Appellation and Consumer 
Characteristics.   
  WTP for 
Appellation  
(1) 
WTP for Appellation 
with Consumer Chars.  
(2) 










   0.65
** 
(0.14) 






   2.19
** 
(0.11) 






   1.63
** 
(0.14) 






   1.92
** 
(0.14) 









Bottles Purchased per Month 
 
  0.042 
(0.072) 
 
Price Paid per Bottle 
 




Years Buying Wine 
 
  0.022 
(0.055) 
 
Wineries Visited per Year 
 
  0.046 
(0.083) 
 
Wine Club Member 
 




Prefer Red Wines 
 
 






  0.86 
(0.63) 
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Table 6 Continued     
  WTP for 
Appellation  
(1) 
WTP for Appellation 
with Consumer Chars.  
(2) 
Read Wine Literature 
 
  0.23 
(0.60) 
 
Keep Wine Journal 
 





















  0.21 
(0.19) 












Log Likelihood Ratio 
 
-3903.7  -3803.8 
Notes: Significance: (**) = p ≤ 0.05; (*) = p ≤ 0.10 with a two-tailed test. 
Reported values are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Number of observations = 1756. 
Source: Laboratory experiment data from rounds 2 and 6. 
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Table 7: Comparison of Regressions of Bids in Rounds 3 and 7 on Appellation, Expert Rating, 
and Consumer Characteristics. 
  WTP for Appellation 
and Expert Rating 
 
(1) 
WTP for Appellation and 
Expert Rating with 
Consumer Chars.  
(2) 
Intercept: California, 77 
Points 



















   0.99
** 
(0.27) 






   1.47
** 
(0.36) 






   1.15
** 
(0.37) 
   1.20
** 
(0.38) 




   0.54
** 
(0.27) 




   1.93
** 
(0.32) 




   2.24
** 
(0.27) 













Bottles Purchased per Month 
 
  0.069 
(0.078) 
 
Price Paid per Bottle 
 




Years Buying Wine 
 
  0.031 
(0.060) 
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Table 7 Continued     
  WTP for Appellation 
and Expert Rating 
 
(1) 
WTP for Appellation and 
Expert Rating with 
Consumer Chars.  
(2) 
Wineries Visited per Year 
 
  0.004 
(0.090) 
 
Wine Club Member 
 




Prefer Red Wines 
 
 





  0.81 
(0.68) 
Read Wine Literature 
 
  0.35 
(0.66) 
 
Keep Wine Journal 
 





















  0.21 
(0.21) 












L: Log Likelihood  -4434.9 
 
-4337.2 
Notes: Significance: (**) = p ≤ 0.05; (*) = p ≤ 0.10 with a two-tailed test. 
Reported values are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Number of observations = 1756. 
Source: Laboratory experiment rounds 3 and 7. 
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Table 8: Regression of bids for wines in rounds 4 and 8 with appellation, expert rating, winery 
name, and consumer characteristics. 
  Bids with Appellation, 
Expert Rating, and 
Winery (1) 
Bids with Appellation, 




77 Points, Beaulieu 
Vineyards 
 















   0.94
** 
(0.34) 



























Expert Rating 85 
(ER85) 
 






Expert Rating 88 
(ER88) 
 
   2.27
** 
(0.35) 
   2.22
** 
(0.35) 
Expert Rating 93 
(ER93) 
 
   4.66
** 
(0.35) 
















   -0.77
** 
 (0.24) 







  -0.24 
(2.05) 	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Table 8 Continued     
  Bids with Appellation, 
Expert Rating, and 
Winery (1) 
Bids with Appellation, 
Expert Rating, and Winery 
with Consumer 
Characteristics (2) 
Bottles Per Month 
 
 
  0.085 
(0.079) 
Price Per Bottle 
 
 
     0.43
** 
(0.08) 
Years Buying Wine 
 






  0.007 
(0.090) 
Member of Wine 
Club 
 
  1.08 
(0.90) 
Prefer Red Wines 
 
 
  0.82 
(0.71) 
Taken a Wine Class 
 






  0.39 
(0.66) 
Keep Wine Journal 
 





















  0.16 
(0.21) 
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Table 8 Continued     
  Bids with Appellation, 
Expert Rating, and 
Winery (1) 
Bids with Appellation, 






9506.4  9322.6 
Bayes Information 
Criterion 






-4739.2  -4633.3 
Notes: Significance: (**) = p ≤ 0.05; (*) = p ≤ 0.10 with a two-tailed test. 
We report estimated coefficients, and standard errors are in parentheses. 
Number of observations = 1756. 
Source: Laboratory Experiment Data from Rounds 4 and 8. 
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Table 9: Regression of bid on objective and intrinsic wine information, including the 
participants’ hedonic ratings of the wines, and consumer characteristics. 
  Regression of Bid on 
Appellation, Expert 
Rating, and Hedonic 
Score (1) 
Regression of Bid on 
Appellation, Expert Rating, 
Hedonic Score, and Consumer 
Characteristics (2) 























































   1.72
** 
(0.60) 
   1.65
** 
(0.60) 
























  0.33 
(1.93) 
Bottles Per Month 
 
 
  0.105 
(0.074) 	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Table 9 Continued     
  Regression of Bid on 
Appellation, Expert 
Rating, and Hedonic 
Score (1) 
Regression of Bid on 
Appellation, Expert Rating, 
Hedonic Score, and Consumer 
Characteristics (2) 
Price Per Bottle 
 
 
     0.321
** 
(0.073) 
Years Buying Wine 
 
 




  -0.002 
(0.085) 
 
Member of Wine Club 
 
 
     1.47
* 
(0.85) 
Prefer Red Wines 
 
 
    0.67 
(0.67) 
Taken a Wine Class 
 
 
    0.42 
(0.65) 
Read Wine Literature 
 
 
    0.38 
(0.62) 
Keep Wine Journal 
 
 




















     0.36
* 
(0.20) 
Akaike Information Criterion  4882.3  4772.1 
Bayes Information Criterion  4939.6  4895.4 
Log Likelihood Ratio  -2429.2  -2360.0 
Notes: Significance: (**) = p ≤ 0.05; (*) = p ≤ 0.10 with a two-tailed test. 
Number of observations = 860; Source: Laboratory Experiment Round 9a and 9b   	 ﾠ 39	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Figure 1: Plot of Bids in Round 9b against Hedonic Rating awarded by each Participant to each 
wine. 




















Hedonic Rating  Hedonic	 ﾠRa ng	 ﾠ(HR)	 ﾠ
Linear	 ﾠ(Hedonic	 ﾠRa ng	 ﾠ(HR))	 ﾠ